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Abstract
We consider electricity generation industries where thermal operators imper-
fectly compete with hydro operators that manage a (scarce) water stock stored
in reservoirs over a natural cycle. We explore how the exercise of intertemporal
market power a¤ects social welfare and environmental quality. We show that, as
compared to the outcome of spot markets, long-term contracting either exacerbates
or alleviates price distortions, depending upon the consumption pattern over the
water cycle. Moreover, it induces a second-order environmental e¤ect that, in the
presence of a thermal competitive fringe, is critically related to the thermal mar-
ket shares in the di¤erent periods of the cycle. We conclude by providing policy
insights.
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1 Introduction
Hydropower is widespread. It is produced by a total of 27; 000 generating units
belonging to 11; 000 power stations located in about 150 countries all over the world.1
Yet, excluding cases like Paraguay, where the quantity of hydropower produced amounts
to ten times the national consumption of electricity, and Norway, where more than 98%
of electricity is produced from hydro sources, hydropower constitutes a relatively small
fraction of total generated power in most countries.2 To be precise, the hydro share
lies generally far below 50% of the overall power-generation mix, with a world average
being about 16%:3 Notwithstanding, this share is likely to play an important role in the
functioning of electricity markets, due to the possibility of hydro-based units being able
to freely allocate water across time periods.4 This appears to be of utmost importance
in contexts where demand and, hence, price vary over time.
Electricity consumption actually follows daily, weekly and seasonal cycles. Despite
technological progress, nuclear plants do not yet exhibit enough exibility to "load fol-
low."5 In practice, given their low marginal costs, nuclear plants are typically used as
a base-load source running constantly over time, under the "merit order" system that
is, by now, in place in most power industries. As a result, even in countries that are
endowed with nuclear stations,6 cyclical peak loads are met by other electricity sources
i.e., hydro and thermal power plants. The latter are essentially fossil-fuel-burning power
plants releasing polluting emissions. This suggests that, in electricity markets, the strate-
gic behaviour of hydro producers is likely to have a non-negligible impact on both price
patterns and environmental outcomes. Here is the exact focus of our paper.
Specically, in our study, we look at situations in which a hydro producer imperfectly
competes with a thermal sector that can have a more or less competitive structure. Hydro
plants use stocks of water stored in reservoirs. The latter are lled by natural inows from
di¤erent possible sources, such as running water from the rivers, rainfall, melting snow
and ice. Replenishment occurs periodically according to a natural cycle, over which the
water reserve is constituted, and then progressively released for production till exhaustion.
A new cycle starts as the stock is renewed.7 By contrast, thermal technology exhibits
1Figures from the International Hydropower Association (compare Crampes and Moreaux [7]).
2See Apergis and Payne [1] for recent data on energy in South America as well as Johnsen [13]
for details about the Norvegian Electric Market. Further examples of countries where hydropower is
especially abundant are Brazil, Canada, Switzerland and Venezuela.
3Source: International Energy Agency [3].
4By contrast, total output cannot be adjusted. On hydro-dominated electricity markets see Rangel
[15].
5On this aspect see the positions of the UK Ministry for Energy, in the Energy Review Consultation
[16], p.60 and p.68.
6Though of similar importance, nuclear power is much less widespread than hydropower. In 2008; with
439 nuclear units operating in 30 countries, the nuclear powers share of worldwide electricity generation
was about 14%: Source: International Atomic Energy Agency [11].
7Hydropower plants also exist that rely upon pump storage, rather than natural storage. According
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no seasonality. However, thermal plants use fuels like gas and coal, and thus generate
negative environmental externalities.
New Zealand is a particularly good example of a country displaying a power-generation
mix with these characteristics. Indeed, in New Zealand, electricity is essentially produced
by a thermal rm (22% gas and 12% coal) and a State-owned Enterprise (ECNZ) that
manages the two major reservoir-storage systems, comprised of a series of dams and
powerhouses mainly located on the rivers (55%) : This is not the sole example though.
In America, a signicant amount of hydroelectric-generation capacity (though less im-
portant than in New Zealand) coexists with thermal stations in the western U.S. Most
hydro plants, concentrated in the Pacic Northwest and California, are controlled by a
single (public) rm, the Bonneville Power Administration, that is in charge of marketing
the electricity produced by federally owned reservoirs along the Columbia River system.
Furthermore, roughly 40% of power in the Chilean Sistema Interconectado Central is
produced by thermal plants, the reminder is hydro-generated, mainly by rainfall water.
In Europe, countries that rely upon a hydro-thermal mix are, for instance, Italy and Fin-
land, where most reservoirs are situated nearby the mountains and lled by melting snow
and ice. In Italy, hydro and thermal plants provide about 13% and 77%; respectively, of
total electricity; in Finland, about 19% and 50%; respectively.8
The markets described above are all imperfectly competitive. From Crampes and
Moreaux [7] (CM hereafter) we learn that, in frameworks where electricity is generated
by imperfectly competing thermal producers and hydro producers, the market outcome
depends on whether or not the latter exert a subtle form of intertemporal market power.
Indeed, not only can hydro producers raise scarcity rents by appropriately scheduling
water releases over the horizon of the natural cycle (this follows from the overall scarcity
of the water reserves together with the possibility to store water at zero operating cost).
They can also act as "Stackelberg leaders" vis-à-vis the thermal competitors because time
irreversibility (together with the inelasticity and the scarcity of water reserves) provides
a natural commitment device for them to produce more in the later periods of the water
cycle. Actually, as pointed out by Murphy and Smeers [14], the former situation is
tantamount to having hydro producers sell output under long-term contracts, the whole
production prole being xed at the outset of the market game. The latter situation
rather mirrors the functioning of spot markets, where hydro producers can revise their
strategy in each period.
CM disclose the implications that the hydro producers strategic behaviour has on
to the International Hydropower Association [12], pump-storage capacity is below 150 GW. This is about
1/6 of the actual installed conventional hydro capacity. We do not consider pump storage because it
raises specic issues, the analysis of which would be beyond the scope of our study.
8In New Zealand, the remainder of power comes from geothermal sources, wind and biomass. In
Italy, it is produced by wind, photovoltaic and geothermal plants, whereas in Finland it is generated by
nuclear stations.
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the performance of hydro-thermal power oligopolies. They do not consider the problems
related to environmental damage, and as such, these problems and consequences are
neglected in their studies. In fact, an important characteristics of the thermal process,
which is based on the use of hydrocarbons, is that it releases polluting emissions. It
follows that, in hydro-thermal electricity markets, not only the strategic behaviour of
hydro producers a¤ects social welfare, but also the externalities induced by the thermal
activity.9
It is well known that, in markets where environmental externalities are present, imper-
fect competition can actually lead to higher social welfare than perfect competition. This
is because the exercise of market power acts essentially as an environmental tax, down-
sizing polluting activities (compare Barnett [3], for instance). In a similar fashion, the
strategic advantage of the hydro producer may be potentially benecial, as it can induce
a reduction in thermal production. In the context we explore, however, a complication
follows from the inelasticity and the scarcity of the water reserve. Indeed, within the
water cycle, any increase in hydro production in one period is associated with an equal
decrease in another period. Under these circumstances, it is far from obvious to which
outcome the interaction between hydro producersstrategic behaviour and environmental
externalities will lead.
The ultimate purpose of our work is to study whether, and how, the adoption of long-
term contracts a¤ects social welfare and environmental quality in electricity industries
with a hydro-thermal generation mix. To do so, we embody the release of thermal emis-
sions into the model of open and closed-loop Cournot competition elaborated by CM.10
Despite resorting to the same representation, we nonetheless provide a richer interpreta-
tion as compared to CM. Similarly to Murphy and Smeers [14], we interpret open-loop
competition as an institutional setting in which output is sold under long-term contracts.
By contrast, closed-loop competition, which rather corresponds to a spot market, is here
considered to be the equilibrium outcome "in the absence of long-term contracting."11 On
9Worldwide institutions are putting increasing emphasis on environmental issues. At the EU level,
environmental concerns evidently appear from the extremely rich package of documents published
by the European Commission on pollution problems (as a review on this, one can visit the site
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/documents_en.htm).
10Several authors have modelled open-loop Cournot games to represent imperfect competition in hydro-
thermal electricity generation with natural storage of water. For the sake of illustration, Arellano [2]
considers a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe and a mixed hydro-thermal generating portfolio,
Bushnell [6] focuses on a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe in which rms possess a mixture
of hydro and thermal resources. Within the open-loop framework, it emerges that hydro operators
can exert static market power (without water withdrawal) by properly choosing how much to use for
production in di¤erent periods, depending upon the specic market conditions. With respect to this
approach, CM push the analysis one step further. Looking at closed-loop games, they highlight that
hydro operators can exert a more sophisticated form of intertemporal market power while competing
with thermal operators. A comprehensive view of the ways hydro producers exert market power is found
in Rangel [15]. The latter also discusses the main competition issues that result from strategic behaviour
in electricity systems dominated by hydro generation.
11Murphy and Smeers [14] study investments in generation capacity in restructured electricity systems.
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top of that, we accommodate for the model to capture various possible market structures.
More precisely, while CM develop the analysis for the case of a single thermal producer,
we allow the thermal activity to be more or less competitive, ranging from the case of a
single producer to that of a competitive fringe.
Analogously to CM, we take competition to occur between producers that use two
di¤erent technologies. While this is the case in countries like New Zealand, as mentioned,
it is not in others, where competition takes place between producers that manage a mix
of production processes. However, this does not invalidate our approach. The model we
adopt, indeed, may well represent competition between generators whose technological
mixes are quite asymmetric.12 We further abstract from the possibility that nuclear
technology may be used. This choice is innocent in that, for the reasons previously
illustrated, our analysis would nonetheless apply to situations in which not only hydro
and thermal plants but also nuclear plants are active. The message we draw is thus more
general than the stylistic simplicity that our model might suggest.
Our analysis delivers two main results.
The rst result pertains to the impact of long-term contracting on social welfare.
We show that the welfare e¤ects depend upon the specic pattern that consumption
follows over the water cycle. More precisely, in frameworks where demand peaks at the
rst period of the cycle, long-term contracting enhances welfare. That is, from a social
viewpoint, open-loop competition is more desirable than closed-loop competition. By
contrast, in frameworks where consumption peaks at the second period after renewal
of the water reserve (and demand seasonality is strong enough), long-term contracting
results in a hydropower prole that yields lower welfare. That is, closed-loop competition
is more desirable from a social perspective. In terms of policy, this indicates that long-
term contracts are to be promoted in the former kind of situations (rst-period peak)
and discouraged in the latter (second-period peak).
The second result regards the impact of long-term contracting on environmental dam-
ages. We nd that whether or not electricity is sold under long-term contracts it is unlikely
to make a signicant di¤erence in terms of environmental quality. This follows from the
observation that, "in a linear context", water transfers have no impact whatsoever on
total thermal production, so that the intertemporal prole of hydro-production has only
a second-order impact on emissions. To make the picture more precise, we further evi-
They use an open-loop Cournot game to model an oligopoly where capacity is simultaneously built and
sold in long-term contracts. They rely upon a closed-loop Cournot game to represent a spot market in
which investment decisions are made in the rst stage and the sales decisions in the second stage.
12One may think about Chile, for instance. In this country, Compañía General de Electricidad, which
uses natural gas to produce electricity, operates in competition with Copec, that generates electricity
based on thermal resources, and Colbún, that currently generates 1274 MW of hydropower and 1236
MW of thermal power from fossil fuels. The latter is destined to become a predominantly hydro producer
once the HidroAysén project to create ve additional hydro plants (in joint venture with Endesa) will
be completed.
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dence that, when the thermal sector turns out to be structured as a competitive fringe
(and, hence, environmental concerns are particularly strong), the environmental e¤ects
are critically related to the pattern of (thermal) market shares rather than to the pattern
of consumption. From a policy viewpoint, it seems impossible to deliver a universal rule
for the fully general case. Yet, the environmental e¤ects of long-term contracting can be
precisely assessed and we explain how to appraise them by means of simple data.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we rst describe
the model and then present the rst- and second-best scenarios. In Section 3, we revisit
the open- and closed-loop Cournot competition à la CM. In Section 4, we identify the
impact of long-term contracting on social welfare and environmental damage. In Section
5, we provide a few policy insights.
2 The model
We adopt a discrete intertemporal model of Cournot competition in power generation.
The model is similar to that of CM with the main novel aspect that environmental
externalities are accounted for. The model is also revisited to accommodate for various
degrees of competition.
Specically, we suppose that electricity is produced by rms that use di¤erent tech-
nologies. One rm, that we name "rm H;" runs hydropower plants. One or more rms,
that we name indi¤erently "sector T" or "rm T" (referring to the representative thermal
rm), manage thermal plants.13 All rms schedule production over a time span of two
periods (t = 1; 2) at zero intertemporal discount. The possibility that generation plants
will be saturated is neglected.14
Thermal output at period t is denoted qTt : The variable cost associated with the
production of qTt units is C
 
qTt

: The function C () is identical in the two periods. It
is increasing and convex in its argument (C 0t  @C=@qTt > 0; C 00t  @2C=@
 
qTt
2
)  0):
Sector T also incurs a xed cost F T : In each period, the thermal process releases polluting
emissions e
 
qTt

; which are larger the bigger the output (e0t  @e=@qTt > 0): Emissions
create an environmental damage D
 
e
 
qTt

; with D () a smooth function increasing in
the level of emissions (D0t  @D
 
e
 
qTt

=@e > 0).
Hydropower is generated using water stored in reservoirs. The available stock of water,
denoted S; is exogenously given as reservoirs are replenished naturally at the beginning
of the rst period. The stock is commonly known in the industry and can be used for
13We refer to a representative rm to model the thermal sector. Two polar cases can arise. First,
this rm acts as a monopolist and we are back to the CM model. Alternatively, it behaves as a price
taker and thus represents a competitive fringe facing a hydropower monopolist. Further details about
the structure of the thermal sector are reported in Subsection 3.1.
14Capacity constraints are possibly captured by innite costs.
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production during the rst and the second period.15 One unit of water allows rm H to
generate one unit of power. Thus, the rm faces the intertemporal water constraintX
t=1;2
qHt  S; (1)
where qHt denotes the quantity of hydropower at period t: As the resource is scarce,
constraint (1) holds, in fact, as an equality and no water is left at the end of period 2: In
other words, no spillage occurs. To perform the activity, rm H bears a xed cost FH :
It incurs no variable cost because the production cost associated with the hydro process
does not depend on using water.16
Electricity is a standardized commodity so that rms o¤er a homogeneous good. Total
utility from consumption of Qt = qTt + q
H
t units of power at period t is denoted ut (Qt) :
The function ut () is period-specic. It is increasing and strictly concave in its argument
(u0t  @ut=@Qt > 0; u00t  @2ut=@Q2t > 0): Environmental externalities do not a¤ect
electricity consumption. In each period, the demand for electricity is perfectly known,
provided the main part of its yearly variability can be predicted with reasonable accuracy.
2.1 First best
We begin by exploring the rst-best scenario. The social-welfare function is written
W
 
qT1 ; q
H
1 ; q
T
2 ; q
H
2

=
X
t=1;2
ut (Qt) 
X
t=1;2
C
 
qTt
  F T   FH  X
t=1;2
D
 
e
 
qTt

: (2)
Social welfare is the di¤erence between consumer utility and social costs. The latter
include the producersproduction costs (i.e., the private costs) and the environmental
damage (i.e., the external cost). The rst-best prole of output is pinned down by
maximizing the social-welfare function subject to (1). Suppose the rst-best allocation
is an interior solution.17 Then, it satises the set of conditions
pt =  = C
0
t +D
0
te
0
t; t = 1; 2; (3)
15In practice, water reserves are constituted in some specic periods rather than at a specic point in
time i.e., depending on the source of reservoirs lling, when rivers are ooding, when it rains intensely,
when snow and ice melt. For the purpose of our model, the availability of the reserve over the two periods
is important.
16In the model, only the thermal process is taken to induce externalities. This does not mean that,
in practice, the hydro process has no environmental impact. Actually, it does induce soil and site
deterioration. Nevertheless, unlike the thermal emissions, the external damage that is provoked by the
hydro technology does not depend on the amount of produced output. Because we are interested mainly
in the rmsproduction strategies, we can neglect the externalities induced by the hydro process.
17Unless otherwise specied, the focus on interior solutions will be maintained throughout the paper,
although welfare maximization may actually call for corner solutions. See CM for a detailed discussion
about corner solutions in an environment where externalities are not accounted for.
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Figure 1: The rst-best output and price proles. The central box, which has a breadth equal to S; shows
how the stock of water is allocated between period 1 (the left quadrant with origin 01) and period 2 (the
right quadrant with origin 02): Given the rst-best thermal output prole (q
T;fb
1 ; q
T;fb
2 ); the optimal water
allocation (qH;fb1 ; q
H;fb
2 ) is such that the period 1 marginal utility p1(qT;fb1 + qH1 ) equals the period 2
marginal utility p2(q
T;fb
2 +q
H
2 ): This situation is represented by point B. The rst-best thermal quantities
are depicted in the extreme quadrants. In the left (resp. right) quadrant, qT;fb1 (resp. q
T;fb
2 ) is such that,
given the optimal hydro output, the period 1 (resp. period 2) marginal utility p1(qT1 + qH;fb1 ) (resp.
p2(q
T
2 + q
H;fb
2 )) equals the period 1 (resp. period 2) social marginal cost c01 +D01e01 (resp. c02 +D02e02):
This situation is identied by point BT1 (resp. B
T
2 ): Points B, B
T
1 and B
T
2 altogether identify the rst-best
price pfb  p1(qT;fb1 + qH;fb1 ) = p2(qT;fb2 + qH;fb2 ): The latter equals the shadow cost of water as well as
the social thermal marginal cost in either period.
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, which rep-
resents the shadow cost of water. Equation (3) says that, at social optimum, electricity
should be equally priced over time. In each period, the energy price should equal the
shadow cost of water as well as the social marginal cost of the thermal output. Because
the cost, the damage and the emission functions are identical in the two periods, sector
T should generate the same amount of power at t = 1; 2: Observe that the demand varies
from one period to the other. The hydro producer should thus compensate for these
variations, thereby perfectly smoothing the thermal output prole.
A graphical illustration of the prole of rst-best prices and quantities, as character-
ized by condition (3), is provided in Figure 1. This and the subsequent graphs (except
for that in Figure 5) are constructed supposing that period 1 is the peak period (i.e.,
the period in which demand is higher) and period 2 the o¤-peak period (i.e., the period
in which demand is lower). In all gures, the relevant functions are drawn as linear for
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purely graphical convenience: the linear stylization does not change the main content of
the graphs.
2.2 Second best
At rst best, producers may not be able to balance the budget. To account for
producersnancial concerns, we now investigate a second-best framework.
In principle, in our setting, budget balance could be an issue for any producer, depend-
ing upon the relative size of xed costs. In practice, in electricity markets, production
technologies are such that marginal and xed costs are inversely related. Typically, in
the thermal process, the marginal cost is large and the xed cost relatively small. In
the hydro process, instead, the xed cost is large and the marginal cost (nearly) zero.
This suggests that the hydro producer would be more likely to incur nancial di¢ culties
at rst best. We thus focus on this case in the sequel of the analysis. It is, however,
noteworthy that we would obtain qualitatively similar results if we consider a situation
in which the thermal sector were exposed to losses at rst best.
The second-best allocation is pinned down by maximizing (2) subject to (1) and to
the constraint
H
 
qH1 ; q
H
2 ; q
T
1 ; q
T
2

=
X
t=1;2
qHt pt (Qt)  FH  0; (4)
which ensures that the prot be non-negative for rm H: Let H be the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with (4). The second-best quantity pair is characterized by the set of
conditions
pt   (C 0t +D0te0t)
pt
= H
sHt
"t (Qt)
; t = 1; 2 (5a)
pt   e
pt
=
H
1 + H
sHt
"t (Qt)
; t = 1; 2; (5b)
where sHt  qHt =Qt is the market share of the hydro producer in period t; "t (Qt) 
 pt=p0tQt; with p0t  @pt=@Qt; is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of market
demand in period t and e  =  1 + H is a deated measure of the shadow cost of
water. Condition (5a) reveals that, at second best, the price exceeds the social marginal
cost of the thermal activity in either period. Indeed, for rm H to break even, sector
T should obtain a larger-than-rst-best per-period markup. Condition (5b) shows that
the price also exceeds the deated shadow cost of water in either period. Specically,
the price obeys a rule that is similar to the monopoly Ramsey rule. According to (5b),
how much the general price level is above rst best depends upon the size of FH ; which
is reected in the ratio H=
 
1 + H

: On the other hand, the specic price level in each
period depends on the demand elasticity as well as on the market share of the hydro
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Figure 2: The second-best output and price proles. Given the second-best thermal-output prole
(qT;sb1 ; q
T;sb
2 ); the second-best water allocation (q
H;sb
1 ; q
H;sb
2 ) is such that the period 1 marginal revenue
MRH1 (q
T;sb
1 +q
H
1 ) from hydro production is smaller than the period 2marginal revenueMRH2 (qT;sb2 +qH2 ):
The second-best equilibria for rm H are identied by points BH1 and B
H
2 in the central box. The second-
best equilibria for rm T are depicted in the extreme quadrants. In the left (resp. right) quadrant, qT;sb1
(resp. qT;sb2 ) is such that, given the second-best hydro output, the period 1 (resp. period 2) marginal
utility p1(qT1 + q
H;sb
1 ) (resp. p2(q
T
2 + q
H;sb
2 )) is larger than the period 1 (resp. period 2) social marginal
cost c01+D
0
1e
0
1 (resp. c
0
2+D
0
2e
0
2): The corresponding equilibrium is identied by point B
T
1 (resp. B
T
2 ): The
price raise above the rst-best level is more important in the peak period (t = 1) ; so that the period 1
second-best price psb1  p1(qT;sb1 + qH;sb1 ) is higher than the period 2 price psb2  p2(qT;sb2 + qH;sb2 ):
producer. That is, ceteris paribus, the price is higher in the period in which the market
demand is less elastic. Moreover, to facilitate break-even, it is optimal that rm H sells
relatively more when the price is higher. A graphical illustration of the prole of second-
best prices and quantities, as characterized by conditions (5a) and (5b), is provided in
Figure 2.
Combining (5a) and (5b) yields
p1   p2 = 
H
1 + H
 
p02q
H
2   p01qH1

(6a)
together with
p1   p2 = 1
H
[(C 01 +D
0
1e
0
1)  (C 02 +D02e02)] : (6b)
Condition (6a) shows that, ceteris paribus, the wedge between the second-best prices
should be larger the tighter the budget constraint of rm H: However, condition (6b)
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further suggests that the divergence in prices comes along with a divergence in social
marginal costs. This means that social costs are not minimized. To contain this e¢ -
ciency loss, the price di¤erence is to be kept as small as possible by raising both prices.18
Noticeably, this distortion can be completely avoided when the cost, the damage and the
emission functions are all linear in quantity. In that case, at second best, the price is
raised above the rst-best level exactly by the same amount in the two periods.
3 Cournot competition
We now concentrate on the situation in which rms compete à la Cournot. As rms
do not take externalities into account, the equilibrium strategies in the Cournot duopoly
are essentially those described by CM. In what follows, we revisit their analysis to allow
for various degrees of market competition. We begin by presenting the open-loop game,
in which rms maximize prots statically. This game mirrors an institutional setting in
which output is sold under long-term contracts. We then consider the closed-loop game,
in which the hydro producer takes advantage of its ability to commit to a given output
prole so as to internalize the e¤ects of its current decisions on future performance. We
interpret this setting, which is more similar to spot markets, as the equilibrium outcome
in the absence of long-term contracts.
3.1 The open-loop game
Before analyzing the open-loop game (i.e., competition under long-term contracting),
we nd it useful to look more deeply into the composition of the thermal sector, which we
have only briey presented within the model description. This allows us to illustrate in
greater details how the analysis of CM is extended to accommodate for market structures
other than the hydro-thermal duopoly they consider.
Sector T (also denominated "rm T" with reference to the representative thermal
rm) includes n 2 N producers competing à la Cournot. For simplicity, assume that
each producer supplies the quantity qt = qTt =n and bears the (private) variable cost
c (qt) = C(q
T
t )=n in each period t: It also incurs the xed cost f = F
T=n: When n = 1;
the market is structured just as in the CM duopoly, in which rm H competes with a
single thermal rm. As n grows very large, the thermal sector becomes a competitive
fringe of price-taking producers. Each producer in sector T takes the production decisions
18An intertemporal divergence arises also at rst best when the e¢ cient allocation is not an interior
solution. In that case, it would be optimal to use the water stock entirely in one period. At rst best, a
corner allocation of the kind qHt = S and q
H
z = 0; q
T
t = 0 and q
T
z > 0 arises whenever  < c
0
t (0)+D
0
te
0
t (0) :
This says that, as long as the shadow cost of water is smaller than the social marginal cost of the thermal
output at qTt = 0; the water reserve should be exhausted at period t and the thermal process should run
only at period z 6= t :
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of the other rms as given and chooses output qt; t = 1; 2; so as to maximize its prot
function
(qt; eQt) = X
t=1;2
qtpt(qt + eQt) X
t=1;2
c (qt)  f;
where eQt = qHt + (n  1) qt denotes the quantity that is provided, in total, by all the
(hydro and thermal) competitors. For each thermal producer, the best response function
is written pt+qtp0t(qt+ eQt) c0t (qt) : Thus, the optimal production rule of the representative
rm T is given by
pt + q
T
t p
0
t = C
0
t; t = 1; 2; (7)
where  = 1=n is to be interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition in the
thermal sector. Clearly, in each period, the price exceeds the marginal cost as long as
 > 0; in which case rm T obtains a positive markup. By contrast, the price is equal to
the marginal cost when sector T is a competitive fringe.
The equilibrium price depends on the market demand, so that it does not need to be
constant over time. Recall that, by contrast, the rst-best price reects only the (social)
costs, hence it is constant across periods. Yet, it exceeds the per-period private marginal
cost, thereby contributing to incorporating the externality indirectly. This evidences that
having the thermal producer exert market power, contributes to alleviating environmental
problems.
FirmH also takes the production decisions of rm T as given and chooses quantity qHt ;
t = 1; 2; so as to maximize the prot function in (4) subject to (1). From the rst-order
condition with respect to the per-period hydro output, one obtains
p1 + q
H
1 p
0
1 = p2 + q
H
2 p
0
2 = : (8)
Firm H allocates the available water so that marginal revenues are equal across periods
and equal to the shadow cost of water. Condition (8) identies the intertemporal prole
of hydropower for any given prole of thermal output. It shows that, at the open-
loop equilibrium, the price exceeds the shadow cost of water at each t: This reects the
benets that rm H obtains, at the margin, in the two periods. From CM we know
that a hydro monopolist allocates water over time so that the peak price is above the
rst-best level whereas the o¤-peak price is below. This intertemporal distortion follows
from the circumstance that water is available in a limited amount.19 In a hydro-thermal
19Were a large amount of water available, the hydro producer could drive the price above the rst-best
level in either period by withdrawing some water from production. To avoid strategic withdrawal, free
disposal is legally banned, in general, in countries where water reserves are copious and hydropower
largely predominates. In addition, public authorities make an e¤ort to solicit and di¤use information on
reservoir-lling. For instance, in Norway, starting from December 2002, the Water Resources and Energy
Directorate began to provide more detailed information, as compared to the past, about reservoirs lling
in the country. In particular, information about aggregate reservoir levels for four di¤erent regions
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Figure 3: The equilibrium with long-term contracts (the open-loop game). Given the open-loop ther-
mal output prole (qT;ol1 ; q
T;ol
2 ); the water reserve is allocated so that the period 1 marginal revenue
MRH1 (q
T;ol
1 + q
H
1 ) from hydro production is equal to the period 2 marginal revenue MRH2 (qT;ol2 + qH2 ):
This situation is represented by point C, which identies the pair of open-loop hydro quantities
(qH;ol1 ; q
H;ol
2 ): Points C
H
1 and C
H
2 represent the open-loop equilibria for rm H in periods 1 and 2;
respectively: The open-loop equilibria for rm T are depicted in the extreme quadrants. In the left quad-
rant, qT;ol1 (resp. q
T;ol
2 ) is such that, given the open-loop hydro output, the period 1 (resp. period 2)
marginal revenue MRT1 (q
T
1 + q
H;ol
1 ) (resp. MR
T
2 (q
T
2 + q
H;ol
2 )) from thermal production is equal to the
private marginal cost c01 (resp. c
0
2): The corresponding equilibrium is represented by point C
T
1 (resp. C
T
2 ):
The shadow cost of water ol is equal to the hydro marginal revenue in either period. The open-loop
period 1 price pol1  p1(qT;ol1 + qH;ol1 ) is larger than the open-loop period 2 price pol2  p2(qT;ol2 + qH;ol2 );
i.e., the price attains a higher level in the peak period (t = 1) :
oligopoly, the hydro producer is a monopolist vis-à-vis the demand that is not served by
the thermal competitors. For a given thermal output prole, water is allocated so as to
create enough shortage and raise scarcity rents in the peak period. The equilibrium of
the open-loop game is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.
3.2 The closed-loop game
Recall that, in the kind of situations we consider, water withdrawal does not occur i.e.,
the hydro producer devotes the entire stock of resource to power generation. Actually, in
such situations, once some hydro output is produced in period 1; the hydro output to be
produced in period 2 is just what is left out of the water reserve
 
qH2 =
 
S   qH1

: This
circumstance provides a natural commitment device to rm H; which can thus act as a
replaced information about aggregate reservoir levels for Norway as a whole (Grønli and Costa [8]).
By contrast, if water is scarce enough, water withdrawal is spontaneously avoided, as it would not be
protable.
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"Stackelberg leader" vis-à-vis the thermal competitors. When this occurs, a closed-loop
Cournot game unfolds. As already mentioned, the outcome of this game can be viewed
as the market outcome in the absence of long-term contracts.
Under closed-loop competition, the quantity prole of rm T still obeys the prot-
maximizing rule in (7). As for rm H; prot maximization now yields
p1 + q
H
1 p
0
1 = p2 + q
H
2 p
0
2
 
1 +QT 02

(9)
= p2 + q
H
2 p
0
2Q
0
2;
where QT 02 
 
dQT2 =dq
H
2

and Q02 
 
dQ2=dq
H
2

: Condition (9), which follows from  dqH2 =dqH1  = 1; dictates the equality between the "relevant" marginal revenues in
period 1 and 2: In the open-loop game, rm H computes the period 2 marginal revenue
taking qT2 as exogenously given. In the closed-loop framework, it anticipates how the
choice of qH1 (and so of q
H
2 ) will a¤ect that of q
T
2 : Specically, rm H forecasts that any
increase in the hydro supply at period 2 will be partially compensated by a decrease in the
thermal supply. Thus, for any given thermal output prole, it now allocates more water
to period 2: It thus exerts a subtle form of intertemporal market power, as evidenced by
CM. At the closed-loop equilibrium, one has
p1 + q
H
1 p
0
1 > p2 + q
H
2 p
0
2:
This inequality shows that the marginal revenue of rm H in period 1 exceeds the mar-
ginal revenue that rm H would get in period 2 in an open-loop game. Remarkably,
ceteris paribus, the hydro producer is better o¤ at the closed-loop equilibrium because,
by accounting for time irreversibility, it is able to take better advantage of the diver-
gence in per-period market conditions. A graphical illustration of the equilibrium of the
closed-loop game is provided in Figure 4.
One might nd the outcomes previously described, at odds with the functioning of
a real-world power generation market, or at least perceive them as a naive view of it.
Indeed, given the costs structure, hydro producers usually have priority over thermal
producers in the merit order of a deregulated market. One might thus quickly conclude
that they will use this advantage to smooth their output prole, leaving to the thermal
competitors the sole residual demand and the burden to adjust production to demand
uctuations. Our analysis evidences that, in fact, a rm that manages a limited water
reserve, stored at no cost, can do better than simply smoothing its production schedule.
The adoption of a more protable (although time-varying) production prole is made
possible precisely because the hydro producer can (i) freely store the resource and (ii)
release it at any time thanks to the priority it receives in the merit order.
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Figure 4: The equilibrium in the absence of long-term contracts (the closed-loop game). The closed-loop
hydropower prole (qH;cl1 ; q
H;cl
2 ) is such that, given the closed-loop thermal output prole (q
T;cl
1 ; q
T;cl
2 );
the period 1 marginal revenue MRH1 (qT;cl1 + qH1 ) from hydro production is larger than the period 2
marginal revenue MRH2 (q
T;cl
2 + q
H
2 ): This reects the circumstance that rm H internalizes the e¤ects
of its current decisions on future performance.
4 Long-term contracting, social welfare and environ-
mental externalities
We have seen that the hydro producer can raise its prot by transferring water strate-
gically over time. In particular, absent long-term contracting (i.e., under closed-loop
competition), rm H produces less in period 1 and more in period 2. This raises two
main questions. First, how does long-term contracting impact social welfare? Second,
how does it a¤ect environmental problems?
Replying to these questions requires that we assess whether open-loop competition
is more or less desirable than closed-loop competition in terms of both social welfare
and environmental quality. However, providing a precise answer is far from obvious as it
depends, a priori, on all the relevant markets and technological characteristics. Despite
this di¢ culty, it is possible to develop general insights by considering specic (and polar)
cases.
To reply to the rst question, we explore a linear framework in which intertemporal
water transfer has no impact on environmental damage. This circumstance enables us to
highlight the impact of long-term contracting on social welfare net of the environmental
externality.
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To reply to the second question, we come back to a general setting and look at the
polar case in which the hydro producer faces a competitive thermal fringe ( = 0) : This
approach is useful in that environmental problems are exacerbated in the absence of market
power on the thermal side. In this case, we derive a very simply rule to decide whether
long-term contracting would lead to an improvement or, conversely, to a deterioration of
environmental health.
4.1 The impact of long-term contracting on social welfare
Observe rst that water transfers are likely to have only a second-order impact on en-
vironmental health. More precisely, if the inverse demand curve and the thermal marginal
cost in period t = 1; 2 are respectively written
pt (Qt) = At  BQt and C 0t
 
qTt

= CA + CBq
T
t ; (10)
then the intertemporal allocation of water does not a¤ect the total thermal production
QT =
P2
t=1 q
T
t : The decrease in thermal production that is induced by an increase in
hydropower supply in one period is exactly o¤set by the associated increase in thermal
production in the other period.20 In other words, as long as (10) holds true, environmental
damages only depend upon QT ; hence they are not a¤ected by strategic water transfers.
Note that this holds true whatever the degree of market competition in the thermal sector
(it does not depend upon ). Thus, it is fair to say that long-term contracting has no
rst-order impact on environmental damages.
Of course, there is no reason for which demand and supply should be linear. Yet, by
restricting our analysis to the setting here introduced, we can isolate the e¤ects of water
transfers (and hence of long-term contracting) on price distortions.
The impact of strategic water allocation is critically related to the market character-
istics. More precisely, it depends on whether demand peaks at the rst or the second
period of the water cycle.21 Given the behaviour of the thermal producers, the socially
optimal allocation of water would be such that the electricity price is constant over time.
20All mathematical details related to this Subsection are relegated to Appendix A.
21Demand peaks at the rst period of the water cycle in regions where the water reserve is formed
in spring and early summer and demand peaks in summer. For instance, in California demand is
highest over the summer period (June through September), when high temperatures trigger over-use
of air conditioners and other coolants (for yearly gures about power demand in California, compare
the California Energy Commission Reports and Outlooks available at http://energyarchive.ca.gov/).
Demand peaks at the second period of the water cycle in countries where the water reserve is formed
mainly in spring, when snow and ice melt, and is used extensively in fall and winter, essentially for heating
purposes. An example is found in the Scandinavian countries (compare Grønli and Costa [8]). Similarly,
customers in the U.S. Pacic Northwest use more electricity in winter than in summer. Nevertheless,
the Columbia River (the largest river in the Pacic Northwest) is driven by snowmelt, with high runo¤
in late spring and early summer (about 60% of the natural runo¤ in the basin occurs during May, June
and July; compare Bonneville Power Administration [5]).
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Whether under open- or closed-loop competition, seeking prots induces the hydro pro-
ducer to supply a sub-optimally low quantity in the peak period so as to raise the marginal
revenue. On top of that, in the closed-loop game, the hydro producer tends to use less
water in the rst period and more in the second. Hence, the above distortion is exac-
erbated if demand peaks in the rst period, and it is lessened if demand peaks in the
second period.
To illustrate this point and to derive precise policy implications, we take the ratio
  (A1   A2) =2B to measure "demand seasonality."22 Demand peaks at the rst period
when  > 0: It peaks at the second period in the converse case. If  is close to zero,
then there is almost no seasonal pattern. If (the absolute value of)  exceeds S=2; then
seasonality is so important that it would be socially optimal to allocate the entire reserve
of water to a single period. This is, however, an extreme case that we have neglected
throughout the analysis. We also let qH;1 denote the hydropower supply in period 1;
when the intertemporal prole of hydro production is chosen to attain the highest level
of social welfare, given that rm T maximizes its prot. Similarly, we let qH;ol1 and q
H;cl
1
denote the hydropower supply in period 1; respectively in the open-loop game and in the
closed-loop game.
Depending upon the specic value that  takes within the relevant interval
 S
2
; S
2

;
two di¤erent regimes can arise, one in which open-loop competition (i.e., long-term con-
tracting) dominates (i.e., yields higher welfare than) closed-loop competition and the
other in which the converse occurs.
The rst regime arises when  2   e; S
2

; where
e  S
2
B [2(B + CB) +B]
(B + CB) [8(B + CB) + 9B] + 2B2
:
This says that demand either peaks at the rst period of the water cycle or it peaks
at the second period, but in a context of weak seasonality (jj small). Under these
circumstances, hydro quantities in period 1 are ranked as qH;cl1 < q
H;ol
1 < q
H;
1 if the peak
is registered in that same period ( > 0). They are ranked as qH;cl1 < q
H;
1 < q
H;ol
1 if
demand peaks at the second period ( e <  < 0): The former ranking is represented
in the upper-right quadrant of the graph in Figure 5, the latter in the area immediately
below the horizontal axis. In either case, welfare levels are ordered as follows:
W (qH;cl1 ) < W (q
H;ol
1 ) < W (q
H;
1 ):
These inequalities show that the intertemporal water allocation in the closed-loop game
22Observe that At=2B would be the equilibrium consumption in period t if the provider were a mo-
nopolist producing at zero marginal cost. The coe¢ cient  is thus the di¤erence between the monopoly
"virtual" consumption levels in the two periods of the water cycle.
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Figure 5: Demand seasonality and hydropower quantities. The graph shows how qH1 (measured on
the horizontal axis) varies as  (measured on the vertical axis) varies on the relevant range
 S2 ; S2  :
The thick, the dashed and the dotted lines represent the functions qH;1 () ; q
H;ol
1 () and q
H;cl
1 () ;
respectively. Hydro quantities are ranked as qH;cl1 () < q
H;ol
1 () < q
H;
1 () for  > 0 (rst-period peak).
They are ranked as qH;cl1 () < q
H;
1 () < q
H;ol
1 () for  2 ( ; 0) (weak second-period peak) and as
qH;1 () < q
H;cl
1 () < q
H;ol
1 () for  2
 S2 ;  (strong second-period peak). Long-term contracts
welfare-dominate for  2   e; S2  :
results in a lower level of welfare, as compared to the open-loop game. Therefore, when
demand peaks at the rst period of the water cycle (or when it peaks at the second period
but the seasonal pattern is weak), long-term contracts would enhance social welfare.
The second possible regime arises whenever  2  S
2
; e : This says that demand
peaks at the second period of the water cycle in a context of signicant seasonality (jj
large). In this case, hydro quantities in period 1 are ordered as qH;cl1 < q
H;
1 < q
H;ol
1 when
seasonality is still "relatively weak." They are ordered as qH;1 < q
H;cl
1 < q
H;ol
1 as seasonality
becomes "su¢ ciently strong." These rankings are represented in the bottom-left area of
the graph in Figure 5, the former for  2 ( ; e) ; with   BS= [4(B + CB) + 2B] ;
the latter for  2  S
2
;  : They are both associated with the following order of welfare
levels:
W (qH;ol1 ) < W (q
H;cl
1 ) < W (q
H;
1 ):
These inequalities show that closed-loop competition yields a higher level of social welfare
than does open-loop competition. One can thus conclude that, as long as demand peaks
at the second period of the water cycle (and seasonality is "strong enough" i.e.,  <  e);
the introduction of long-term contracts would actually lower social welfare.
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The analysis developed so far shows that seasonality is policy-relevant when demand
peaks at t = 2; whereas it is not when demand peaks at t = 1: The reason for this is to
be found in the strategic structure of the closed-loop game. In the latter, by comparison
with the open-loop game, rm H transfers some water from period 1 to period 2; as to
induce its thermal competitor(s) to reduce production in period 2. This contributes to
exacerbating scarcity problems in period 1; and to alleviating them in period 2: There-
fore, when demand peaks at period 1; a shift from open-loop competition to closed-loop
competition unambiguously exacerbates the scarcity problem in that period. By contrast,
when demand peaks at period 2; the same shift alleviates the scarcity problem in that
period. However, if seasonality is weak, then the scarcity problem is likely to be of little
importance. Thus, in the shift to closed-loop competition (i.e., when renouncing long-
term contracts), the benets attached to the scarcity reduction in period 2 may actually
be lower than the costs induced by the scarcity raise in period 1:
One last point is worth noting. The insights we have drawn from the analysis are valid
whatever the degree of competition in the thermal sector. Indeed, as previously pointed
out, the absence of environmental impact within the linear framework is not related to
the specic market structure. The fact that the hydro producer tends to supply a sub-
optimally low quantity in the peak period, is also very general and independent of : The
same holds true for the comparison between the closed-loop and the open-loop intertem-
poral output prole. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the phenomena under scrutiny does
depend upon the market structure. In particular, when the thermal producers are not
endowed with market power and thus act as price-takers ( = 0), they do not account
for the impact that a transfer of water to period 2 will have on the period 2 marginal
revenue. Hence, ceteris paribus, they contract their production less than they would if
they were to behave strategically. In the closed-loop game, this induces rm H to keep
more water in the rst period and there is less of a di¤erence between the open and the
closed-loop outcome. It also follows that the degree of seasonality e at which the switch
from the rst to the second regime occurs, is closer to zero when the hydro producer faces
a competitive thermal fringe than it is when the hydro producer faces a unique thermal
competitor ( = 1) : In other words, the less the thermal sector is competitive, the larger
the set of circumstances under which long-term contracting appears to enhance social
welfare.
4.2 The impact of long-term contracting on environmental dam-
age
We shall now explore how the strategic behaviour of the hydro producer (i.e., whether
or not output is sold under long-term contracts) a¤ects environmental problems. To this
aim, we need to come back to a general setting, in which both welfare and environmental
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e¤ects appear. In this framework, one can identify a precise condition under which total
damage is increased, as water is transferred from period 1 to period 2; by computing the
marginal impact of water transfers on thermal production (see Appendix B). One can
thus identify the precise conditions under which the introduction of long-term contracts
leads to a reduction in environmental damages.
As far as the fully general case is considered, the aforementioned condition is so
intricate that it does not provide much intuition, and remains of scarce practical guidance.
In a recent study, however, Billette de Villemeur and Pineau [4] show that this condition
takes a particularly simple form when the hydro producer faces a competitive thermal
fringe. In this situation, environmental problems are especially strong as thermal rms do
not contract output as to exert market power. Arguably, given that the e¤ect of strategic
water transfers on emissions are likely to be of a second order, this is the only situation
in which the environmental impact of long-term contracting is to be accounted for.
Specically, when  = 0; total damage is increased as water is transferred from period
1 to period 2 if and only if
D02e
0
2
D01e
0
1
sT2
sT1
<
"2=2
"1=1
; (11)
where sTt  qTt =Qt denotes the thermal market share and t 
 
pt=q
T
t
  
dqTt =dpt

=
pt=C
00
t q
T
t denotes the elasticity of the (competitive) thermal supply in period t = 1; 2:
Assuming that both polluting emissions and environmental damages are proportional to
thermal output so that the marginal damage is constant and identical in the two periods
(D01e
0
1 = D
0
2e
0
2); this further reduces to
sT2
sT1
<
"2=2
"1=1
: (12)
This says that long-term contracting (less water transferred from period 1 to period 2 )
is benecial to the environment whenever the ratio of thermal market shares
 
sT2 =s
T
1

is
"su¢ ciently low."
Whether condition (11) holds true is, in our opinion, mainly an empirical question.
In fact, the pattern of market shares has no obvious link with that of equilibrium prices
(or consumption). More precisely, one can easily establish that:
Q2t
dsTt
dpt
=
dqTt
dpt
qHt   qTt
dqHt
dpt
:
Arguably, when demand peaks, prices are higher and both hydro and thermal producers
tend to supply more in that period. If the water reserve is su¢ ciently large, so that
qHt
 
dqTt =dpt

> qTt
 
dqHt =dpt

; then the pattern of thermal market shares tends to follow
the price (or demand) pattern. Conversely, if the water reserve is relatively scarce, then
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thermal market shares tend to display an opposite pattern as compared to prices.
The associated heuristic is that, ceteris paribus, when water is relatively abundant,
both price distortions and environmental damages are likely to be reduced by long-term
contracting in situations in which consumption peaks in the rst period rather than in the
second period of the water cycle. By contrast, when water is relatively scarce (and thus
external costs potentially greater), price distortions and environmental damages move
in opposite directions. That is, an intertemporal water transfer that exacerbates price
distortions lessens environmental damages and vice versa. Given that environmental
e¤ects are likely to be second-order ones, we believe that, in this latter case, the sole
price distortions should be considered to appraise the opportunity of resorting to long-
term contracts.
5 Concluding remarks
Two main insights can be drawn from our analysis.
First, in hydro-thermal electricity markets where hydro producers manage a scarce
water reserve that is naturally renewed over time, the adoption of long-term contracts
can have either a negative or a positive e¤ect on social welfare, depending upon the
intertemporal consumption pattern over the water cycle. Specically, our results suggest
that, when demand displays signicant seasonality, long-term contracts tend to reinforce
price distortions (i.e., closed-loop competition welfare-dominates open-loop competition)
as long as consumption peaks at the second period of the water cycle. On the other
hand, long-term contracts attenuate price distortions (i.e., open-loop competition welfare-
dominates closed-loop competition) whenever consumption peaks at the rst period. In
terms of policy, this points to the conclusion that long-term contracting should be deterred
in the former case and promoted in the latter.
The second insight is that long-term contracts are likely to have a minor impact on
environmental quality, since strategic water transfers have only a second-order e¤ect on
total thermal output. This result evidences that the exercise of intertemporal market
power by hydro producers is not comparable to the exercise of "standard" market power
that, rather, induces a rst-order e¤ect. Neither does it work as a simple tax, which would
also have a rst-order impact. Because environmental health does not depend critically
on the adoption of long-term contracts, pollution control in hydro-thermal electricity
sectors does not seem to be crucial for deciding whether or not to rely on the latter. This
also makes the di¢ culty less relevant in identifying simple and universal guidelines for
assessing the environmental e¤ects of long-term contracting. Notwithstanding, our study
does provide a practical recipe for appraising the marginal environmental impact in a case
in which pollution issues are exacerbated, namely when the thermal sector is a perfectly
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competitive fringe. Specically, this requires the use of data about the intertemporal
pattern of (thermal) market shares over the water cycle.
We limit ourselves to study how the adoption of long-term contracts a¤ects the out-
come of hydro-thermal electricity markets. An open question is how to design appropriate
corrective interventions in order to decentralize the optimal intertemporal hydropower
prole. This question is on our research agenda.
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A The impact of long-term contracting on social wel-
fare
Suppose that, in period t = 1; 2; the inverse demand curve is written
pt (Qt) = At  BQt:
By denition pt = U 0t (Qt) so that
Ut (Qt) =

At   1
2
BQt

Qt:
Further suppose that the total thermal cost function is given by
C
 
qTt

=

CA +
1
2
CBq
T
t

qTt + F
T :
Finally, suppose that the damage function is given by
D
 
e
 
qTt

= DqTt :
A.1 The thermal best reply
Under Cournot competition, the best-reply function of the representative thermal rm
is written
pt (Qt) + p
0
tq
T
t = C
0  qTt  :
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Hence, in the particular framework here considered, it species as
At  BqHt   (1 + )BqTt = CA + CBqTt :
This yields the prot-maximizing thermal quantity
qTt =
At   CA  BqHt
(1 + )B + CB
:
As a result, the market quantity in period t is found to be
Qt
 
qHt

= qHt + q
T
t
 
qHt

=
At   CA + (B + CB)qHt
(1 + )B + CB
:
Total thermal output over the two periods is thus given by
Q =
X
t=1;2
Qt =
A1 + A2   2CA + (B + CB)S
(1 + )B + CB
;
which does not depend upon qH1 : It follows that the total environmental damage is con-
stant i.e., dTD
dqH1
= 0 with TD  D
X
t=1;2
qTt the sum of environmental damages in the two
periods.
A.2 The optimal value of qH1
Social welfare is written
W
 
qH1 ; q
H
2

=
X
t

At   1
2
BQCt

QCt   (CA +D) qT;Ct  
CB
2
(qT;Ct )
2

=
X
t

At   B
2
At   CA + (B + CB)qHt
(1 + )B + CB

At   CA + (B + CB)qHt
(1 + )B + CB
 
X
t
(CA +D)
At   CA  BqHt
(1 + )B + CB
  CB
2
X
t

At   CA  BqHt
(1 + )B + CB
2
Notice that the expression of W here above is quadratic in qHt : Because q
H
2 =
 
S   qH1

;
we have an expression that is quadratic in qH1 ; which yields a unique maximum (the
coe¢ cient of
 
qH1
2
being negative). Changes in welfare are monotonic on each side of
this maximum.
Let us calculate
@W
@qH1
=
(B + CB)
2 +BCB
[(1 + )B + CB]
2
 
A1   A2 +BS   2BqH1

;
which is zero for
qH;1 =
S
2
+
A1   A2
2B
:
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This is the value of qH1 that yields the largest level of welfare when thermal rms maximize
prots. We have
qH;1 > 0 ,
  (A1   A2)
B
< S
qH;1 < S ,
A1   A2
B
< S:
A.3 The value of qH1 under open-loop competition
Using (8) we deduce that the open-loop value of qH1 is given by
qH;ol1 =
S
2
+
A1   A2
2B
(B + CB)
2(B + CB) +B
:
We have
qH;ol1 > 0 ,
  (A1   A2)
2B
<
S
2

2(B + CB) +B
B + CB

qH;ol1 < S ,
A1   A2
2B
<
S
2

2(B + CB) +B
B + CB

:
Because (B+CB)
2(B+CB)+B
< 1; it is straightforward to see that
qH;ol1 < q
H;
1 ,
A1   A2
2B
> 0
qH;1 < q
H;ol
1 ,
A1   A2
2B
< 0:
A.4 The value of qH1 under closed-loop competition
Noticing that
dqT2
dqH2
=
 B
(1 + )B + CB
;
the closed-loop value of qH1 is given by
qH;cl1 =

S +
A1   A2
2B

2(B + CB)
4(B + CB) +B
:
We have
qH;cl1 > 0 ,
  (A1   A2)
2B
< S
qH;cl1 < S ,
A1   A2
2B
<
S
2

2(B + CB) +B
B + CB

:
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A.5 Ranking quantities and welfare levels
We hereafter provide the overall ranking of quantities. Once hydro quantities are
ranked in period 1; the ranking of welfare levels can be drawn.
A.5.1 First-period peak: A1 A2
2B
> 0
We have qH;ol1 < q
H;
1 : Let us check whether it is q
H;ol
1 < q
H;cl
1 : This occurs if and only
if
A1   A2
2B
<
S
2

2(B + CB) +B
B + CB

:
Recall that this is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for both qH;cl1 and q
H;ol
1 to be
smaller than S: Therefore, this condition is to be satised and, hence, the converse case
is to be ruled out. Also recall that qH;1 < S if and only if
A1 A2
2B
< S
2
: Because S
2
<
S
2
h
2(B+CB)+B
B+CB
i
; the relevant situation is that in which A1 A2
2B
2  0; S
2

: Then, we have
qH;cl1 < q
H;ol
1 < q
H;
1 and W (q
H;cl
1 ) < W (q
H;ol
1 ) < W (q
H;
1 ):
A.5.2 Second-period peak: A1 A2
2B
< 0
We have qH;1 < q
H;ol
1 : Let us check whether it is q
H;ol
1 < q
H;cl
1 : This occurs if and only
if   (A1   A2)
2B
<  S
2

2(B + CB) +B
B + CB

;
which is never the case because the left-hand side is positive. Hence, we have qH;cl1 < q
H;ol
1 :
Let us next check whether qH;1 < q
H;cl
1 : This occurs if and only if
A1   A2
2B
<
S
2
  B
2(B + CB) +B

:
We can thus distinguish the following two situations:
1. A1 A2
2B
2

 BS
2[2(B+CB)+B]
; 0

; in which case we have
qH;cl1 < q
H;
1 < q
H;ol
1 and W (q
H;
1 ) > max
n
W (qH;cl1 );W (q
H;ol
1 )
o
:
2. A1 A2
2B
2

 S
2
;  BS
2[2(B+CB)+B]

; in which case we have
qH;1 < q
H;cl
1 < q
H;ol
1 and W (q
H;ol
1 ) < W (q
H;cl
1 ) < W (q
H;
1 ):
To see how welfare levels are exactly ranked in the rst regime of case 2, one should
plug qH;cl1 and q
H;ol
1 into W and compare. Without developing the whole calculation, one
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can notice that it is W (qH;ol1 )  W (qH;cl1 ) if and only if
A1   A2 +BS
B
(qH;ol1   qH;cl1 )  (qH;ol1 )2   (qH;cl1 )2:
This is rewritten as
A1   A2 +BS
B
(qH;ol1   qH;cl1 )  (qH;ol1   qH;cl1 )(qH;ol1 + qH;cl1 ):
Because qH;ol1   qH;cl1 > 0; we can further write
A1   A2 +BS
B
 qH;ol1 + qH;cl1
or, equivalently,
qH;1 
qH;ol1 + q
H;cl
1
2
:
This shows that we have W (qH;ol1 )  W (qH;cl1 ) if and only if the socially optimal hydro
quantity does not exceed the arithmetic mean of the open-loop and the closed-loop hydro
quantities. The value of A1 A2
2B
at which W (qH;ol1 ) =W (q
H;cl
1 ) is such that (q
H;
1   qH;ol1 ) =
(qH;ol1   qH;1 ); that is
A1   A2
2B
=  S
2
B [2(B + CB) +B]
8(B + CB)2 + 9B(B + CB) + 2B2
:
Let us now calculate
@
@

 S
2
B [2(B + CB) +B]
8(B + CB)2 + 9B(B + CB) + 2B2

=
SB
2
16B(B + CB)
2 + 16B2(B + CB) + 5B
3
[8(B + CB)2 + 9B(B + CB) + 2B2]
:
Because this derivative is positive, the value of A1 A2
2B
at which W (qH;ol1 ) = W (q
H;cl
1 )
increases with :
B The impact of long-term contracting on environ-
mental damage
Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to qHt yields
1 +
dqTt
dqHt

p0t + 

dqTt
dqHt
p0t +

1 +
dqTt
dqHt

qTt p
00
t

=
dqTt
dqHt
C 00t ; t = 1; 2;
so that
dqTt
dqHt
=
p0t + q
T
t p
00
t
C 00t   (1 + ) p0t   qTt p00t
; t = 1; 2: (13)
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Let t  p00t = ( p0tQt) denote the degree of relative prudence in period t = 1; 2: Replacing
into (13) and using also the denition of demand elasticity yields
dqTt
dqHt
=
 

1
"tQt
  qTt t"t

C00t
pt
+ (1 + ) 1
"tQt
  qTt t"t
; t = 1; 2:
We thus have
dqT1
dqH1
=
 

1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1

C001
p1
+ (1 + ) 1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1
and
dqT2
dqH1
=
1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2
C002
p2
+ (1 + ) 1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2
:
A variation in qH1 triggers the following change in total damage TD 
X
t=1;2
D
 
e
 
qTt

:
dTD
dqH1
= D01e
0
1
dqT1
dqH1
+D02e
0
2
dqT2
dqH1
:
Substituting from above, we thus obtain
dTD
dqH1
=
D02e
0
2

1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2

C002
p2
+ (1 + ) 1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2
 
D01e
0
1

1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1

C001
p1
+ (1 + ) 1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1
:
We have dTD
dqH1
< 0 if and only if
D02e
0
2

1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2

C002
p2
+ (1 + ) 1
"2Q2
  qT2 2"2
<
D01e
0
1

1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1

C001
p1
+ (1 + ) 1
"1Q1
  qT1 1"1
:
With t 
 
pt=q
T
t
  
dqTt =dpt

= pt=C
00
t q
T
t ; t = 1; 2; this is rewritten
D02e
0
2
h
sT2   2
 
qT2
2i
"2
2
+ (1 + ) sT2   2 (qT2 )2
<
D01e
0
1
h
sT1   1
 
qT1
2i
"1
1
+ (1 + ) sT1   1 (qT1 )2
If the marginal damage does not change from one period to the other (that is, D01e
0
1 =
D02e
0
2), then the inequality above reduces to
sT1   1
 
qT1
2
sT2   2 (qT2 )2
>
"1
1
+ sT1
"2
2
+ sT2
:
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B.1 The thermal sector as a competitive fringe
When rm H competes with a competitive fringe, it is  = 0: We then have
dqTt
dqHt
=
  1
"tQt
1
tq
T
t
+ 1
"tQt
=
 tsTt
"t + ts
T
t
< 0; t = 1; 2;
and so
dDt
dqHt
=
 D0te0ttsTt
"t + ts
T
t
< 0; t = 1; 2:
This says that a raise in hydropower in period t induces, in that same period, a reduction
in thermal output and, hence, a reduction in environmental damage. Because
dqT1
dqH1
=
 1sT1
"1 + 1s
T
1
< 0 and
dqT2
dqH1
=
2s
T
2
"2 + 2s
T
2
> 0;
a raise in hydropower in period 1 also induces a raise in thermal output (and so in
environmental damage) in period 2: Overall, we have
dTD
dqH1
=
D02e
0
2
1 + "2
2s
T
2
  D
0
1e
0
1
1 + "1
1s
T
1
:
This is negative if and only if (11) in the text holds.
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